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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Although it may be reasonable after indictment to require the presence
of counsel, since it can be assumed that after indictment the State probably has
its case prepared and is merely attempting to bolster it by defendant's admis-
sions, this does not seem to be the case after arrest. This may have been Judge
Van Voorhis' real reason for dissenting in Waterman.
The actual application of the principal case is not clear. As has been
previously stated, police officers are not required to inform the defendant of
his rights. Since these precedents were not overruled, the question remains
whether the right to counsel is absolute after arrest, or whether it is only the
failure to answer the defendant's inquiry which renders the statement inadmis-
sible. If the principal case's holding is to be construed as giving an absolute
right to counsel, it may have a serious effect on the administration of criminal
justice; if it is to be restricted to the case where the inquiry goes unanswered,
what is the result if the inquiry is answered "yes" or "no"?
It is difficult to predict the exact future effect of the principal case. It is
clear at this point that after indictment, counsel must be present at all ques-
tionings. Although a recent decision in the Appellate Division held that the
right to counsel was absolute after arrest,0 7 this writer doubts if the Court of
Appeals will go that far.
R.E.N.
DUE PROCESS REQUIREs COUNSEL IN WAYWARD MINOR PROCEEDING
Since the turn of the century, the state and federal courts of this country
have been harrassed by the problem of balancing the needs implicitly expressed
in social-reform legislation with the constitutional commandments they have
sworn to uphold. One area in which this "balancing" problem has been acutely
difficult concerns the crimes or misconduct of infants. Juvenile Delinquency
and Wayward Minor Statutes seek to rehabilitate a child in preference to
administering punishment. The most popular method of achieving this goal
is to relax the protections of the ordinary trial process so that sociological and
psychological considerations may be dispositive. While the courts may admire
this end, the burden remains with them to determine when the process of relax-
ation shades into a denial of constitutional rights. The leading case of People
v. Lewis68 presented just such a confrontation in 1932, and the recent case of
People v. James,69 vividly illustrates that the problem is still with us, little
diminished in difficulty.
Title VII-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure,"0 first added to the statute
books in 1923, provides the procedure for hearing wayward minor charges. In
its current form it provides that any magistrate other than a justice of the
peace may, upon an information laid before him by a variety of persons, hear
67. People v. Meyer,-A.D.2d-(lst Dep't October 10, 1961).
68. 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
69. 9 N.Y.2d 82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1961).
70. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 913-a to 913-dd.
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and determine the charge upon competent evidence. The proceedings are
applicable only to persons between the ages of 16 and 21, and are to be
conducted in courts of criminal jurisdiction according to the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The Penal Law, Section 486, provides that, for crimes other than
those punishable by death or life imprisonment, a person between the ages of
7 and 16 shall be treated as a juvenile delinquent. Portions of the Children's
Court Act define that treatment. Upon sufficient evidence a judge exercising
jurisdiction under the Act may determine that the child has been delinquent.
No formal rules of evidence need be followed, nor does the Code of Criminal
Procedure govern in any manner. For purposes of comparison, the pertinent
provisions are set out below.
I. Definitions
Wayward Minor (James)-Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 913-a.
Wayward minor.-Any person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-
one who either (1) is habitually addicted to the use of drugs or the
intemperate use of intoxicating liquors, or (2) -habitually associates
with dissolute persons, or (3) is found of his or her own free will and
knowledge in a house of prostitution, assignation or ill fame, or (4)
habitually associates with thieves, prostitutes, pimps, or procurers, or
disorderly persons, or (5) is wilfully disobedient to the reasonable and
lawful commands of parent, guardian or other custodian and is morally
depraved or is in danger of becoming morally depraved, or (6) who
without just cause and without the consent of parents, guardians or other
custodians, deserts his or her home or place of abode, and is morally
depraved or is in danger of becoming morally depraved, or (7) who so
deports himself or herself as to wilfully injure or endanger the morals
or health of himself or herself or of others, may be deemed a wayward
minor. The interstate compact on juveniles shall apply to wayward
minors to the same extent as to minors below sixteen years of age
except that the provisions of article four of said compact shall apply
only to wayward minors included within (6) hereof.
Juvenile Delinquent (Lewis)-Children's Court Act, Section 2(2).
"Delinquent child" means a child (a) who violates any law or any
municipal ordinance or who commits any act which, if committed by
an adult, would be a crime, except any child fifteen years of age who
commits any act which if committed by an adult would be a crime
punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless an order removing
the action to the children's court has been made and filed pursuant to
section three hundred twelve-c, subdivision (c) and section three hun-
dred twelve-f, subdivisions (a) and (b) of the code of criminal pro-
cedure; (b) who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient
and beyond the control of his parents, guardian, custodians or other
lawful authority; (c) who is habitually truant; (d) who, without just
cause and without the consent of his parent, parents, guardians or
other custodian, repeatedly deserts his home or place of abode; (e)
who engages in any occupation which is in violation of law, or who
associates with immoral or vicious persons; (f) who frequents any
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place the existence of which is in violation of law; (g) who habitually
uses obscene or profane language; (h) who begs or solicits alms or
money in public places under any pretense; or (i) who so deports him-
self as to wilfully injure or endanger the morals or health of himself
or others.
II. Jurisdiction and Manner of Jurisdiction
Wayward Minor (James)-Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 913-b.
Person may be adjudged a wayward minor.-Such person, where the
charge is established upon competent evidence upon a hearing, may be
so adjudged by any magistrate, other than a justice of the peace,
where an information is laid before him on the complaint of a peace
officer, parent, guardian, or other person standing in parental relation
or being the next of kin, or a principal or teacher of any school where
such person is registered for attendance, or by a representative of an
incorporated society doing charitable or philanthropic work.
Juvenile Delinquent (Lewis)-Children's Court Act, Section 4, vests juris-
diction exclusively in the Children's Court. Section 22 provides for an informal
hearing.
III. Effect of Adjudication
Wayward Minor (James)-Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 913-dd.
Effect of adjudication.-In the event any person is adjudged a way-
ward minor under the provisions of this title, such determination
shall not operate as a disqualification of any such person subsequently
to hold public office, public employment, or as a forfeiture of any
right or privilege or to receive any license granted by public authority;
and no such person shall be denominated a criminal by reason of such
determination, nor shall such determination be deemed a conviction.
Juvenile Delinquent (Lewis)-Children's Court Act, Section 45.
4. No adjudication under the provisions of this act shall operate as a
disqualification of any child subsequently to hold public office or as
a forfeiture of any right or privilege or to receive any license granted
by public authority; and no child shall be denominated a criminal by
reason of such adjudication, nor shall such adjudication be denomi-
nated a conviction. Neither the fact that a child has been before the
children's court for hearing nor any confession, admission, or state-
ment made by him to the court or to any officer thereof while he is
under the age of sixteen years, shall ever be admissible as evidence
against him or his interests in any other court.
Comparison makes it apparent that, while both statutes aim at a relaxation of
the ordinary criminal process, the Wayward Minor Provisions do not consti-
tute as radical a departure as the Juvenile Delinquency Sections, in particular
Section 22.
In People v. James,71 defendant, then 16 years old, was charged with
71. Supra note 69.
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being drunk, disobedient to his mother, truant from school and in danger of
becoming morally depraved, all in violation of Section 913-a of the Wayward
Minors Law. He was first brought before the City Magistrates Court of New
York City, a criminal court, on the strength of the complaint made by his
mother. He was carelessly advised of his right to secure counsel by a court
officer and immediately thereafter put on probation upon the recommendation
of. a social worker assigned to the case. Two months later, at the request of
his mother and the probation department, the charges were heard, judgment
entered and sentence imposed. No advice as to the defendant's right to counsel
or his privilege against self-incrimination was proffered at this second hearing,
and it appears that there was serious dispute as to whether the defendant had
acted as his mother charged.
In People v. Lewis, 72 defendant, then 15 years old, was charged with
stealing $12.00 from a Binghamton, New York grocery store, escaping with his
companions to Buffalo in a stolen car. His hearing was before a judge acting
under the provisions of the then newly instituted Children's Court Act. There
was no acrimony; the delinquent was comforted by the sympathy of family
and clergy, and there was no dispute as to the facts. The constitutional prob-
lem arose when the defendant was not advised of the self-incrimination privi-
lege; his guilt was established exclusively on the basis of his own confession.
Defendant James, charged with being "wayward," was held to have been
deprived of a constitutional right to secure counsel. Defendant Lewis, charged
with criminal conduct, was held not to have been so deprived.
The Court, in striking its balance, made special reliance on certain dis-
tinctions between James and Lewis as follows:
1. The Lewis proceeding was held in Children's Court, while the
James case was tried in a court of criminal jurisdiction.
2. Similarly, Lewis involved the Children's Court Act while the Code
of Criminal Procedure governed James.
3. In Lewis there was no dispute as to the salient facts establishing
guilt, while in James, the testimony was completely contradictory,
making the latter proceeding of an adversary nature.
4. In Lewis, the minor had the support and comforting presence of
his mother, sister and clergyman, while in James, the mother was
the hostile complainant and as well, the defendant had not a friend
in court.
With these findings setting the tenor of the proceedings below, and after
setting forth the perfunctory notice given defendant of his right to counsel,.
the Court held that, "elementary principles of justice would seem to require
that in this situation the testimony of the mother should have been tested by
some form of cross-examination ... ," and "the rights of the defendant minor
were not adequately protected without the aid of counsel.
'73
72. Supra note 68.
73. People v. James, supra note 69 at 85, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
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In Lewis, the Court was also interested in the "coloring" of the events
surrounding the proceeding, but for it the first question was whether or not
the legislature could constitutionally enact as it had. Finding the power to be
in the legislature, the natural consequence was a decision stating that in a
non-criminal trial, there was no right to criminal constitutional safeguards.
While it is true that Judge Couch wrote a strong dissent, in contrast to the
unanimous opinion rendered in James, a reading of the two cases, one after
the other, leaves one with the feeling that the 1932 court was far surer of the
absoluteness of the consequences flowing from its answer to the "first ques-
tion." There was no great concern evidenced then in regard, for instance, to
the presence or absence of friends in court.
This "feeling" or " intuition" that the balancing problem is today more
frustrating than it was 30 years ago is heightened by a cataloguing of some
of the other factors bearing on the case. The Court was here faced with the
legislature's decision requiring it to enforce constitutional guarantees more
strictly in a case of non-criminal conduct (truancy-James) than it would in
a case of criminal conduct (larceny-Lewis), a rather anomalous situation.
Looking ahead, the Court might ponder the value of its decision as a guideline
in the face of the ever-impending, but now repealed Youth Court Act, which,
if ever passed, will eliminate the problem entirely.74 Still another consideration
before the Court was the possible erosion of the Lewis doctrine that might
ensue from a decision contradicting its principles.
This latter problem was disposed of when the Court said "we find it
unnecessary to re-examine the doctrine announced in the Lewis case: . . Y
Counsel for defendant took much space in his brief in an attempt to convince
the Court that Judge Crouch was really right after all. Such an effort indicates
that counsel was not impressed with his position on the other matters. As is
evident from the phrase above quoted, the Court saw little merit in beating a
dead horse. The differences in the statutory outline, the necessity of the estab-
lished procedure to the proper functioning of the Children's Court, and the
availability of other grounds, militated against such an approach.
One of the "other grounds" just mentioned is the "nature of the pro-
ceedings" test. The use of this device apparently stems from In re Clausi,70
where Lewis was interpreted as declaring that the initial forum of hearing
determines the applicability of constitutional safeguards. Thus, a filiation pro-
ceeding instituted in Children's Court was civil, 76 but a paternity proceeding in
the New York City Court of Special Sessions was criminal. 77 The argument
appears in the case, and of the six citations in the opinion, three deal with the
74. The Youth Court Act of 1956 with an effective date put off each year to the
next succeeding year, would have provided Juvenile Delinquency type hearings for all
minors accused of any form of anti-social conduct. It was repealed by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961.
75. 296 N.Y. 354, 73 N.E.2d 548 (1947).
76. Ibid.
77. Commissioner of Public Welfare v. Simon, 270 N.Y. 188, 200 N.E. 781 (1936).
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topic. It is puzzling to ponder over the court's refusal to make this test the
basis of the decision; or, in the alternative, to rely solely on the cited case of
People ex rel. Cohen v. Brown,t which held that a wayward minor must make
an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Curiously missing in the briefs of
counsel and in the Court's opinion is People v. Shannon, a well-reasoned
recent Appellate Division case. There it was held that youthful offender pro-
ceedings were "criminal in nature," that Lewis was not controlling for that very
reason, and that defendant could not "be convicted on his confession, standing
alone." The Youthful Offender Provisions appear immediately after the Way-
ward Minor Sections. Their Section 913-n is the exact duplicate of Section
913-d of the Wayward Minor provisions and Section 45 of the Children's Court
Act. There seems to be no substantial distinction between the cases. What may
be said of one holds with equal impact for the other. But all the Court of
Appeals was willing to say on the matter was that "there is some grounds for
the assertion that it [James] was criminal in nature."
8 0
Perhaps the explanation lies in an examination of the basis for decision
chosen by the Court. It has this merit; without expressly withdrawing from
Lewis, and without foreclosing the question regarding the nature of a way-
ward minor proceeding, it has left itself an opening to pick and choose among
the situations where, to its mind, wayward minors should be given the
constitutional safeguards of a criminal trial. The method chosen has this
obvious defect; the courts of original jurisdiction will be less surehanded in
using their discretion to determine whether they are involved in the process
of "saving" a child or "punishing" a criminal.
E.H.
ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL IS WITHIN DISCRETION OF COURT
A defendant accused of a felony may not be denied his right to counsel
under our concept of a fair hearing, this right encompassing both the engage-
ment of an attorney and the assignment by the court for an indigent defendant.
81
In New York, if a defendant appears for arraignment without counsel, the
court must ask if he desires one, and if so the court then must assign counsel.
8 2
The selection of counsel in the instance of assignment is within the discretionary
power of the judge, but to what extent does this discretion exclude the defendant
from having a voice in such assignment? Whether this discretion may deny or
interfere with the defendant's right to counsel, either in his inherent right to
select and engage an attorney of his own choice, or in the manner of such
assignment was the fundamental problem confronting the Court in People v.
Brabson.
83
78. 278 App. Div. 576, 102 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1951).
79. 1 A.D.2d 226, 149 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2d Dep't 1956).
80. People v. James, supra note 1 at 85, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
81. People v. Price, 262 N.Y. 410, 187 N.E. 298 (1933).
82. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308.
83. 9 N.Y.2d 173, 212 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1961).
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